‘Iraqifada’ causes manpower problem
Nov. 24, 2003: Long before former President Bush authorized the “surge” in Iraq, before Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld resigned his position under criticism for deploying too few troops and before Americans saw their family members in the National Guard deployed and re-deployed multiple times, Joseph Farah’s G2 Bulletin sounded the alarm that U.S. estimates of 5,000 terrorists in-country meant a whole new war requiring many more coalition troops.
Coining the term, “Iraqifada,” Farah pointed to guerilla-war experts who said in such conflicts, the conventional forces need at least a 20-to-1 manpower advantage.
Indeed, a British officer, a veteran of the street fighting in Londonderry, said the numbers should actually be much higher, more like 50 to 1. The average the Indian army holds in the Jammu and Kashmir area is close to 100 to 1.
U.S. military planners did not count on a stiff guerrilla war following the
